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REPORT OF THE COMSTAC TASK GROUP ON 
SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WORLD SPACE MARKET
Robert D. Jones
Program Manager-Advanced Technology 
Rocketdyne Division-Rockwell International
ABSTRACT
This paper is based on the evaluations of the special Task 
Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory 
Committee as reported to the Department of Transportation. 
The Task Group analyzed the impact of entry of former 
Soviet Republics into world commercial space market and 
provided policy recommendations to the Secretary of Trans­ 
portation. The use of Soviet launch series by United States 
origin satellites should not be allowed until enforceable, fair 
rules are agreed to by the United States and the Common­ 
wealth of Independent States.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is based on the evaluations by the special Task 
Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory 
Committee (COMSTAC) as reported to the Department of 
Transportation. The Task Group performed appropriate 
investigations and provided draft recommendations for 
consideration by the Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Committee membership.
The charter of the Task Group was to—
• Compile the Soviet's space transportation products and 
services being offered.
• Assess the marketability of these products and services.
• Evaluate the impact that market entry would have on the 
domestic space transportation industry and include potential 
opportunities as well as threats,
• Prepare National Space Policy recommendations to as­ 
sure the future viability of the commercial space transpor­ 
tation industry.
The Task Group had members from launch vehicle and 
satellite industries to encourage a fair hearing on policy 
recommendations from both perspectives. Membership of 
the Task Group was as follows:
Rick Hauck International Technology Underwrit­ 
ers (INTEC)
Lee Scherer General Dynamics Commercial 
Launch Services
David Braverman Hughes Aircraft Company
Bill English Legal Consultant
Rex Hollis Space Systems/Loral
Bob Jones Rockwell International, Rocketdyne
Division
Sam Mihara McDonnell Douglas Aerospace 
Gil Rye Orbital Sciences Corporation
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PROCESS
The Task Group held biweekly meetings over a period of 
several months. Interviews were conducted with individuals 
from National Space Council, Office of US Trade Repre­ 
sentative, Congressional Research Service, National Aero­ 
nautics and Space Administration, Department of State, 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) marketing 
representatives, and contractors who have recently visited 
the CIS. The group also met with Dr. Roald Saghdeev, the 
former director of the Institute for Space Research in 
Moscow. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
(OCST) authorized an on-site visit within CIS by one of 
their support contractors, Berner, Lanphier and Associates, 
who also provided data to the Task Group.
STATUS OF CIS PROGRAM
The military and civilian space programs of the former 
Soviet Union were completely intertwined. At the peak, 
1000 industrial and research organizations were involved, 
employing over one million people. With the breakup of the 
union, "ownership" of the various organizations trans­ 
ferred to the republics in which they were located. About 
80% of these are in Russia. With little central funding, each 
factory and laboratory is independently seeking foreign 
business.
Present US policy does not permit the export of our 
satellites for launch from the Soviet Union. This policy is 
based primarily on national security concerns. These con­ 
cerns are greatly reduced now, and CIS leaders are urgently 
requesting a change in our policy to allow them to earn hard 
currency by providing launch services for Western satel­ 
lites.
SPACE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
The family of CIS vehicles is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
Soviet Union consistently conducted more than four times as 
many launches each year as did the United States.
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Figure 1. Former Soviet Union Launch Vehicles
Medium and Large Launch Vehicles
The largest commercial launch service market today is 
for medium and large communication satellites. Satellites in 
this group weigh more than 3000 Ib to geosynchronous 
transfer orbit. The US family of launch vehicles for this 
market consists of Delta, Atlas, and Titan. The CIS 
competitors in this class are the Proton and Zenit launch 
systems. Their performance capabilities are shown in 
Figure 2.
Proton has been operational for more than 25 years and 
has flown more than 200 missions with a cumulative 
reliability of about 88%. It has been used to boost payloads 
to low Earth orbit, geosynchronous transfer orbit, and for 
interplanetary missions. The Proton is designed at KB 
Salyut and manufactured at the colocated Krunitschev 
production plant in Russia. The vehicles are integrated with 
the spacecraft horizontally and launched from Baikonur. 
During the July visit to Krunitschev, the Proton reliability 
was reported to be 97.5%, and more than 30 flights have 
been successful since 1988.
Zenit was first introduced in 1985, it is one of the newest 
of the CIS launch vehicles. One two-stage version (Zenit 2) 
has flown to date. First flight of the three-stage version 
(Zenit 3) is scheduled for 1993. The Zenit 3 is the version 
competing for the medium and large communication satel­ 
lite market. Zenit is produced at the Yuzhnoye factory in the 
Ukraine, but its engines are manufactured in Russia. The
payload for Zenit is also integrated horizontally and is 
launched from Baikonur. A string of 14 successful launches 
between April 1985 and May 1990 was followed by three 
successive failures. In November 1992, the Zenit was 
successfully launched, placing an early warning satellite 
into orbit.
Small Launch Vehicles
The United States has the Scout, Conestoga, Taurus, and 
the air-launched Pegasus in this weight class. The most 
competitive CIS vehicles are the Kosmos and Tsyklon, as 
well as modified weapons systems such as SS-18 and the 
air-launched SS-24. The performance capabilities of these 
vehicles are shown in Figure 3.
Kosmos was first introduced in 1964. Its launch rate has 
been 7 to 10 per year and nearly all launches are from 
Plesetsk.
Tsyklon was first introduced in 1966. Its launch rate has 
been 10 to 16 per year.
SS-18 is an intercontinental ballistic missile for which 
CIS is seeking commercial uses.
SS-24 is a smaller weapon system which can be air- 
launched from an AN-124 aircraft located anywhere in the 
world. It is a direct competitor to the US Pegasus.
The first flight of SS-25 is scheduled for 1993.
Plans are in work to try commercialization of submarine- 
launched missiles for suborbital microgravity missions.
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Figure 2. Medium and Large Competitive Launch Vehicles
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Launch Sites
Within CIS, there are three launch sites as shown in 
Figure 4:
• Kapusin Yar is primarily used for suborbital and sounding 
rockets.
• Baikonur is equivalent to Cape Canaveral. It is a site for 
all manned, geosynchronous, lunar, and interplanetary 
launches. There are four Proton and two Zenit pads, but one 
Zenit pad is reported to be damaged by a recent failure.
• Plesetsk is the CIS equivalent of Vandenberg Air Force 
Base. Until recent years, this was a secret site used mainly 
for military missions.
MARKETABILITY
Several factors determine the marketability of CIS launch 
vehicles from the satellite owner's perspective. The princi­ 
pal ones and an assessment of western customers' views of 
these factors are as follows:
• Political and economic stability—Uncertain.
• Performance—Wide spectrum of choices.
• Compatibility—Probably feasible.
• Reliability—Generally equivalent to Western launchers.
• Licensing—US policy change required.
• Prices—Historically less than Western launchers.
• Schedule—Good with multiple pads and short interval 
between launches.
• Facilities—Excellent, but require horizontal spacecraft 
integration.
• Personnel accommodations—Acceptable.
• Contract authority and enforceability—Uncertain.
With the current political and economic situation, receipt 
of hard currency has become of fundamental importance to 
the CIS. There have been several reports of offerings of CIS 
launch vehicles at prices well below those of Western 
launchers. The launch price for a Proton, including space­ 
craft integration, was quoted at $56 million in mid-1992. 
The latest reports suggest that launch service prices will be 
placed just enough below the perceived prices of Western 
launchers to make the sale.
The maintenance of a reliable launch schedule in the face 
of economic and political instability is a most volatile factor 
influencing marketability. There is concern about the 
instability and uncertainty in regulations and laws, the lack 
of legal information and a reliable banking system, and the 
general unpredictability in the commercial environment. 
The stability of US policy must also be given prime 
consideration.
The Market
The worldwide commercial launch vehicle supply al­ 
ready exceeds commercial satellite demand, even without 
the entrance of the CIS into the commercial market. Note 
that in Figure 5 forecasted demand for medium and large 
launch vehicles remains relatively constant throughout the 
remainder of the decade while supply increases with the 
introduction of the H-2 and Ariane 5 vehicles in the 
mid-1990s. Obviously, entry of CIS vehicles into the 
international market will exacerbate the fierce competition 
already existing among the Western launchers: Ariane, 
Delta, and Atlas.
Kazakhstan 
Baikonur Cosmodr/Fhe (45.6 deg N)
Figure 4. Launch Sites of Former Soviet Union
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Figure 5. Medium to Heavy Commercial Satellite Market Forecast
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Small vehicle launchers face a similar situation. Demand 
is forecasted to increase sharply in the next several years, 
but then remain at a constant level through the end of the 
decade. Domestic supply alone is almost two times that of 
the projected market.
CONCLUSIONS
There exists in the former Soviet Union a highly capable 
and robust space transportation capability. If allowed to 
offer launch services for the satellites for the world without 
constraints, the CIS could completely dominate the market.
Today the CIS is a nonmarket economy. Prices for launch 
services can be adjusted as necessary to ensure a sale, 
Western launch providers would not be able to compete if a 
level playing field is not enforced.
From a customer perspective, political stability within 
CIS may be the overriding concern for some period of time. 
Other major concerns relate to business matters: who has the 
authority to sign a contract, insurance, legal aspects, and 
general unpredictability in the commercial environment.
The number of satellites requiring commercial launch 
services is estimated to be between 12 and 15 per year. He 
launch services suppliers of today—the US companies and 
Arianespace—have a capability of about 26 launches per 
year, The supply will be increased with the entry of the 
Japanese H-2 and the larger Ariane 5, both of which are 
planned to enter the market about 1996. The launch services 
supply by the end of the decade will be roughly twice the 
demand without the entry of the CIS capabilities into the 
market.
The commercial market for small satellites has not really 
developed as yet. Since hundreds of ICBMs and thousands
of submarine-launched missiles will become surplus, this 
market could be completely disrupted if these ex-weapons 
systems are permitted to be used in this manner.
There are numerous opportunities for conducting busi^ 
ness ventures in the space arena of the former Soviet Union. 
Given their desperate economic situation, it is concluded 
that the number of good opportunities may be decreasing 
with time.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The CIS must, with respect to its international customers, 
agree to abide by certain special conditions designed to 
avoid unfair conditions.
The use of CIS launch services by United States origin 
satellites should not be allowed until such time as enforce­ 
able fair rules are agreed to by the United States and CIS.
The US government should take an immediate, active 
role to encourage and assist industry and government 
agencies in the purchase of space-related CIS research and 
technology (ideas, studies, personnel, and use of facilities).
The US launch industry should not be subjected to unfair 
competition, particularly of the magnitude represented by 
the CIS launcher capability. Pricing of CIS launch services 
offered on the world market must be similar to those prices 
prevailing in the international market for comparable com­ 
mercial launch services. The advice of the launch and 
satellite industries representatives should be solicited in 
arriving at a pricing standard less subject to broad interpre­ 
tation and more easily applied and enforced. A workable 
regime is essential to ensure that the transition process 
occurs in a measured manner.
Direct and indirect government support must be in accord 
with practices (by governments and market economies) 
prevailing in the international market.
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No access to technology will be permitted except that 
specifically authorized by the US government.
Effective means of enforcing all special conditions must 
not only be established but rigorously applied.
International Maritime Satellite organization (INMAR­ 
SAT) has submitted a request to be allowed to use Proton for 
the launch of one of their INMARSAT III satellites. 
Acceptance of this current proposal would establish a
precedent difficult to contain as others make similar re­ 
quests. Approval of such requests should await the negoti­ 
ations of the transition trade agreement.
The US policy should direct that our surplus strategic 
assets not destroyed but retained by the US government not 
be used for any commercial purposes. The US should assure 
that the CIS place the same restrictions on reuse of their 
excess strategic missiles. If they refuse, appropriate trade 
sanctions should be imposed.
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